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ON PLANTINGA'S WAY OUT 
Dale Eric Brant 
The foreknowledge problem involves two assumptions. First, that "God 
once believed that an event would occur now" is about the past. Second 
that it is equivalent to "God once existed and the event is occurring now." 
These, Plantinga argues, are incompatible. But he (implicitly) makes 
assumptions. First, that equivalent propositions are both about a given 
time, or neither are. Second, that if a proposition is (is not) about a given 
time, so is (neither is) its negation. Third, that if two propositions are (are 
not) about a given time, so is (neither is) their conjunction. These, though 
plausible, are incompatible. 
In trod uction 1.2 
Since Nelson Pike published his resuscitation of Boethius's problem with 
the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, most of 
the historical answers to the problem have been suggested. 3 These 
include that of Boethius himself/ that of Scotus,' that of Ockham6 and 
that of Molina.7 Each of these answers to the foreknowledge problem has 
its proponents, but the prominent solution seems to be Ockham's. In a 
nutshell, the foreknowledge problem begins by noticing that for any 
proposition, God's past belief of that proposition implies its truth. But it 
is too late now to do anything about God's past beliefs. God's past 
beliefs are per accidens necessary. So it is already too late to do anything 
about anything that that belief implies. If the object of belief is a proposi-
tion describing future human action, it is already too late to do anything 
about that action. In an equally simplistic nutshell, Ockham's view is 
that, because God's past belief about a future human action implies the 
truth of a future contingent, the claim that God held that past belief 
depends for its truth on the future conditions that will make that future 
contingent true. Because it depends on future conditions, the claim that 
God held that past belief is not per accidens necessary: even now, it's not 
too late to do something about it. I intend to argue that there are some 
fairly general reasons to think that at least one rather basic brand of 
Ockhamism fails as a solution to the foreknowledge problem. Note that I 
am not taking a stand here on the success or failure of the foreknowledge 
problem or any of the other proposed solutions to it. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 14 No.3 July 1997 
All rights reserved 
334 
ON PLANTINGA'S WAY OUT 335 
Hard and Soft Facts 
Pike's first respondent, John Turk Saunders,8 put forward something 
like an Ockhamist attack on the foreknowledge problem. He claimed 
that there is something odd about God's past beliefs, if they really do 
imply their future contingent objects. This oddity leads one to wonder 
whether God's belief is not like the proposition that Caesar was assassi-
nated two-thousand and nine years before Saunders would write his 
paper. The latter does indeed imply the (at the time of Saunders rumi-
nations about Pike's paper) future contingent proposition that Saunders 
would write. But it is not too late (or, at least, it wasn't in AD 1965) to 
do something about that claim, even though it is about Caesar's assassi-
nation in 44 Be. This is because it depends on (and is also about) 
Saunders's writing of his paper in AD 1965. Perhaps it is likewise not 
too late to do something about God's past beliefs of future contingents. 
In response to Saunders, Pike coined the phrase "hard facts" to refer to 
conditions in the past that are completely over and done with. 
Propositions express hard facts, when they are strictly about the past. 
Soft facts are facts that are not hard. Propositions express soft facts 
when they are not strictly about the past. Pike grants that it is now too 
late to do something about hard facts and only hard facts about the past. 
But since Pike numbers God's (or anyone's) past beliefs among the hard 
facts about the past (while numbering the fact that Saunders would 
write 2009 years after Caesar's assassination among the soft facts), the 
impact of the foreknowledge problem remains undiminished. 
One may restate the Ockhamist line in terms of the hard-facti soft-fact 
distinction by saying that because God's past belief of some future con-
tingent depends on (i.e. implies) the truth of its future contingent object, 
that belief and any like it is a soft fact. Saunders, for example, would 
have said that his writing of his paper in AD 1965 is as much a part of 
the fact that God held a belief in 44 BC that Saunders would write as it is 
a part of the fact that Saunders would write 2009 years after Caesar was 
assassinated. In addition to Saunders, for whom Ockhamism was not all 
that central, such important thinkers as Marilyn Adams and Alvin 
Plantinga (the latter of whose account of Ockhamism will figure promi-
nently in this paper) and a host of others have endorsed Ockhamism as 
the solution to the foreknowledge problem, classifying God's past beliefs 
of future contingents as soft, rather than hard, facts about the past. 
I do think that there are problems with the host of individual efforts at 
Ockhamist solutions alluded to above. But as problematic as I find them, in 
this paper I shall only attack the view held by Plantinga. This is not that 
great a limitation, however, since Plantinga's account depends only on a pair 
of very minimal assumptions which he thinks (rightly in my opinion) are at 
the core of Ockhamist intuitions about the distinction between hard facts and 
soft facts. I shall identify another pair of assumptions also at the core of these 
Ockhamist intuitions (and if anything, buried deeper in that core than 
Plantinga's assumptions) and show that this core is (surprisingly) inconsis-
tent. Before doing that, however, I would like to present the foreknowledge 
problem in a manner that will facilitate the rest of my discussion. 
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The Foreknowledge Problem in Detail 
Let us consider a specific argument for theological incompatibilism in 
the case of an agent, X, an act, A, and a future time period, t'. Suppose 
that X will do A during t' and that there was a past time period, t, dur-
ing which God believed that X would do A during t'. Then the argu-
ment proceeds as follows: 
(1) "God believed during t that X would do A during t'" is true, 
and X cannot do anything during t' to render it false. 
(2) "God existed during t and X will do A during t'" implies that 
X will do A during t'. 
(3) "God believed during t that X would do A during t'" and 
"God existed during t and X will do A during t'" are equiva-
lent. (By God's Essential Omniscience) 
(4) "God believed during t that X would do A during t'" implies 
that X will do A during t'. (By 2 and 3) 
(5) X will do A during t', and X cannot do anything during t' to ren-
der false the proposition that X will do A during t', i.e. X could 
not have done otherwise. (By 1 and 4) 
This form of the incompatibilist argument is not the simplest form of 
the argument possible. Ordinarily, the incompatibilist would just take 
(4) as the basic deterministic premise and argue from (1) and (4) to (5). 
Premise 0) is supposed to be true because God's past beliefs (whatever 
their objects) are past facts, so it is too late now to prevent such beliefs 
from occurring. Ordinarily, the Ockhamist would attack premise 0) on 
the grounds it is not too late to prevent God's past belief if the implica-
tion mentioned in premise (4) holds, since, if that implication holds, 
God's past belief is a soft fact about the past.9 But the form as given 
lends itself to my discussion by allowing me to consider and criticize 
that extremely minimal, but intuitively appealing, form of Ockhamism 
offered by Plantinga. 
As I suggested in the previous paragraph, if premise (1) in the argu-
ment above holds, it holds because t, the time during which God held 
His belief, is in the past relative to t', the time during which X will do A. 
Thus an underlying assumption of the argument above is the following: 
The Principle of the Fixity of the Past (provisional) 
No one can do anything during a present or future time period to 
render false a truth about a past time period. 
It is easy to misconstrue this principle as a special case of the truism 
that, because truth and falsity are incompatible, one cannot render a 
truth false, i.e. that one cannot render a proposition false while having it 
remain true. Indeed some arguments for this principle, such as the one 
given by Thomas, misconstrue it in just that way.!O But "one cannot ren-
der a truth false" is ambiguous (and uncontroversially true only under 
one of its interpretations). As already noted, no one has the power to 
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render any proposition false while having it remain true: were that 
power exercised, some proposition would be both true and false. But 
someone might have the power to render some proposition false, and 
that proposition might happen to be true: were that power exercised, the 
proposition would not be true; it is partly because this power is not exer-
cised that the proposition is true. 
Now, if the principle of the fixity of the past were nothing more than 
an expression of the first interpretation of "one cannot render a truth 
false," it would have nothing special to say about human power over the 
past, since truth and falsity are incompatible no matter what time it is. 
Instead, the principle of the fixity of the past says that, while someone 
may sometimes have an (unexercised) power to render some proposi-
tions false even though they happen to be true, no one has such a power 
over propositions which are about the past. The passage of time makes 
it impossible to affect the truth-value of some truths which might have, 
at one time, been such that it was possible to affect their truth-values. 
In any event, this principle as it is instantiated in premise (1) is what 
provides the necessity to the antecedent of the implication mentioned in 
premise (4). Since this antecedent is necessary (with respect to human 
capacity), and the implication itself is a logical implication, it follows 
that the consequent, Le. the proposition that X will do A during t', is nec-
essary (again with respect to human capacity). So even though the fixity 
of the past, by itself, is compatible with one's having the power to ren-
der false truths about the present or future, when you add that God's 
past beliefs imply every truth about the present or future (so that one 
would have to render false a truth about God's past belief in order to 
render false a truth about the present or future), the only conclusion you 
can draw is that one does not have even an unexercised power to render 
false truths about the present or future. 
Ockhamism in Detail 
The Ockhamist's first insight is noticing that some propositions about 
past time periods are strictly about the past-such as the proposition 
that Admiral Nelson was killed at Trafalgar in AD 1805. Some are not-
such as the proposition that Nelson was killed over 190 years before I 
would submit this paper. In general, one may speak of propositions that 
are strictly about a given time period. For propositions about the past, 
the time period in question is just the set of past moments, but when 
speaking of the times that propositions are about, there is no reason to 
limit our attention to the past time period only. The second proposition 
about Nelson's death, for example, is strictly about the time period from 
AD 1805 to AD 1998, though not strictly about the past. In general, if a 
proposition, P, is about only (but not necessarily all and only) moments 
that occur during a time period, t, then P is strictly about t. One conse-
quence of this is that if P is strictly about t, and t' completely overlaps t, 
then P is also strictly about t'. The first proposition about Nelson's death 
at Trafalgar is strictly about several (infinitely many in fact) time peri-
ods: the past, the 1800's, 1805 and 21 October 1805 to name four. 
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The first insight also means that 
for the time period t, we can define 
two sets of propositions, At and Bt. 
At contains all and only those 
propositions that are strictly about 
t, and Bt contains all and only 
those propositions that are not 
strictly about t. The very descrip-
tion of the two sets guarantees that 
their intersection is empty, that 
I I their union is the set of all proposi-The Partition of Logical Space tions, and that (unless t is empty or 
t is the set of all moments) neither 
At nor Bt is empty. 
The Ockhamist's second insight is noticing that the principle of the 
fixity of the past is not plausible for propositions that are not strictly 
about the past: one might be able to do something to render false a 
proposition that, though about the past, is not strictly about the past. 
This is because one might render the whole proposition false in virtue of 
just those elements of it that are not about past moments. So: 
The Principle of the Fixity of the Past 
No one can do anything during a present or future time period to 
render false a truth strictly about a past time period. 
The Ockhamist's third insight is to note that "God existed during t and X 
will do A during tIt, (a critical component of the foreknowledge problem as 
presented above, see especially premises (2) and (3» is not strictly about the 
past. Plantinga actually notes that "The time period, t, existed and X will do 
A during tIt' is not strictly about the past, but the usefulness of this observa-
tion in attacking the foreknowledge problem along Ockhamist lines turns 
out to depend on the equivalence of "The time period, t, existed and X will 
do A during tIt' with "God believed at t that X would do A at t'." That equiv-
alence ends up depending in tum on the necessary existence of God. 
Plantinga could have gotten along without that assumption by simply mak-
ing the observation I attribute to 'The Ockhamist' at the beginning of this 
paragraph, since the conjunction "God existed during t and X will do A dur-
ing t''' is also equivalent to "God believed during t that X would do A during 
tIt, (as noted in premise (3) of my schematization of the foreknowledge prob-
lem). Either way, what seems to underlie this insight is the following: 
The Mixed Conjunction Principle 
The conjunction of one proposition strictly about a time period and 
another not strictly about that time period is also not strictly about that 
time period. 
Plantinga adopts something like the mixed conjunction principle as an 
intuitive constraint on our understanding of the distinction between proposi-
tions strictly about a time period and those not strictly about that time peri-
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od. He seems willing to allow the entire hard-facti soft-fact distinction to 
turn on whether that principle is true. As I will indicate below, I think that 
he is right about this: if there is a hard-fact I soft-fact distinction at all, some-
thing like the mixed conjunction principle must be true. 
It may already be obvious, however, that for premise (1) of the incompatibilist 
argument to be called into question it is "God believed during t that X would do 
A during t'," not just "God existed during t and X will do A during t'," which 
must fail to be strictly about the past. This is a bit difficult to credit. But now the 
Ockhamist can bring forward a fourth insight on the distinction between proposi-
tions strictly about a time period and those not strictly about that time period. So: 
The Equivalence Principle (provisional) 
If two propositions are equivalent, then one of them is strictly about a 
given time period only if the other is also strictly about that time period. 
Plantinga expresses both the mixed conjunction principle and the equiva-
lence principle in the following from his "On Ockham's Way Out" (the ital-
ics are mine, and the bracketed section represents a place where I replaced a 
numerical tag with the sentence it tagged): 
We may not be able to give a criterion for being strictly about the past, 
but we do at least have a rough and intuitive grasp of this notion. Given 
our rough and intuitive grasp of this notion, I think we can see two 
things. First, no conjunctive proposition which contains [the proposition 
that Paul will mow his lawn in 1999] as a conjunct is (now in 1986) strict-
ly about the past.... And second, hard facthood is closed under logical 
equivalence: any proposition equivalent (in the broadly logical sense) to a 
proposition strictly about the past is itself strictly about the past." 
While Plantinga explicitly states only the provisional equivalence principle 
outlined above, let me take a second look at the division of the set of all proposi-
tions into the set of propositions strictly about t (At) and the set of propositions 
not strictly about t (Bt) in the light of the provisional equivalence principle. This 
principle says that if P is a member of At and Q is equivalent to P, then Q is a 
member of At. Well if P is a member of Bt, and Q is equivalent to P, then Q had 
better be a member of Bt also (for if Q 
were a member of At, then by the pro-
visional equivalence principle, P 
would have to be a member of At also 
and not Bt). So the equivalence princi-
ple should really go as follows: 
The Equivalence Principle 
If two propositions are equivalent, 
then one of them is strictly about a 
given time period just in case the 
other is also strictly about that 
time period. The Equivalence Principle 
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Now the equivalence and mixed conjunction principles work for the 
Ockhamist as follows. Since "God believed during t that X would do A 
during t'" and "God existed during t and X will do A during t'" are 
equivalent, the equivalence principle forces a choice between both being 
strictly about t on the one hand and neither being strictly about t on the 
other. The mixed conjunction principle guarantees that "God existed 
during t and X will do A during t'" is not strictly about t. So, "God 
believed during t that X would do A during t'" must also fail to be strict-
ly about t. Thus the principle of the fixity of the past no longer supports 
premise (1) of the incompatibilist argument. 
I must say that I think that Plantinga is dead right in this much: the 
mixed conjunction principle and the equivalence principle are central to 
the overall project of Ockhamism. I think that they serve as constraints 
on the Ockhamist's understanding of the distinction between proposi-
tions strictly about a time period and those not strictly about that period. 
If this is right, then, even though my attack is limited to Plantinga's 
Ockhamism, if I can show that there is a conceptual problem for the 
simultaneous truth of these principles (and other principles that lie at 
the core of the Ockhamist's distinction between propositions strictly 
about a given time period and those not strictly about that time period), 
my criticism of Ockhamism will turn out to be quite general indeed. 
Logical Difficulties for Ockhamism 
Now, the fact that the equivalence principle is a closure principle 
makes me wonder: Are there other plausible closure principles. I am 
prepared to insist that there are two more. For the first one, let me note 
that Plantinga actually committed himself to a bit more than the mixed 
conjunction principle in the passage quoted above. Consider this 
excerpt again: 
(no conjunctive proposition which contains [the proposition that 
Paul will mow his lawn in 1999] as a conjunct is (now in 1986) 
strictly about the past.. .. 
This actually says that the conjunction of a proposition not strictly about 
the past (like the one about Paul and his lawn in 1999) and any proposi-
tion, be it strictly about the past or not, is not strictly about the past. 
Thus a first stab at another closure principle is as follows: 
The Pure Conjunction Principle (provisional) 
The conjunction of two propositions not strictly about a given time 
period is also not strictly about that time period. 
This gives us the additional principle to which Plantinga is explicitly 
committed. And I must say that it seems both obvious and central to the 
Ockhamist's distinction between propositions that are, and propositions 
that are not strictly about a given time period. If "Jane goes to the party 
an hour before John" is not strictly about eight o'clock (John having gone 
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then), and "Mary goes to the party two hours before John" is not strictly 
about eight o'clock, it is hard to see how the conjunction of these two 
could be strictly about eight o'clock. If there can be conjunctions strictly 
about eight 0' clock, this conjunction had better not be among them. 
But what about the conjunction of two propositions both of which are 
strictly about a given time period. Well it seems obvious to me that the 
conjunction is also strictly about the time period in question. If "Jane goes 
to the party on Monday" and "Mary goes to the party on Monday" are 
both about Monday, what could the proposition that they go together be 
about? Tuesday? I must also say that this point seems, if anything, more 
central to the Ockhamist's distinction between propositions that are, and 
propositions that are not strictly about a given time period than any of the 
closure principles that we have seen so far. So I think that Ockhamists, 
like Plantinga, must augment the pure conjunction principle so: 
The Pure Conjunction Principle 
The conjunction of two proposi-
tions strictly about a given time 
period is also strictly about that 
time period, and the conjunction 
of two propositions not strictly 
about a given time period is also 
not strictly about that time period. 
I think that there is one more 
closure principle that Ockhamists 
should adopt as part of their core 
of intuitions about the distinction 
between those propositions strictly 
about a given time period and 
those not strictly about that time 
period. This has to do with the 
negations of each type of proposition. 
The Negation Principle 
The negation of a proposition 
strictly about a given time peri-
od is also strictly about that time 
period, and the negation of a 
proposition not strictly about a 
given time period is also not 
strictly about that time period. 
This one also seems fairly obvi-
ous. If "Jane goes to the party on 
Monday" is strictly about 
Monday, just what time period 
would "J ane does not go to the 
party on Monday" be about? 
iThe Pure Conjunction Principlei 
So: 
r--, 
B 
I 
The Negation Principle 
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Tuesday? I suppose that one might have this worry: that there are 
ways that "Jane does not go to the party on Monday" could be true 
and still fail to be about Monday, e.g. if time came to an end on 
Sunday. Not so with "Jane goes to the party on Monday." If the lat-
ter proposition is true, then Monday exists, and it looks as though 
that's the time that that proposition is about. So it looks as though 
"Jane goes to the party on Monday" is strictly about Monday, but 
"Jane does not go to the party on Monday" is not strictly about 
Monday. But this objection misses the point of the negation princi-
ple. The negation principle merely says that if "Jane goes to the party 
on Monday" is strictly about Monday, then its negation is also about 
Monday. And it is worth noting that there is no more guarantee that 
"Jane goes to the party on Monday" is strictly about Monday than 
there is that its negation is strictly about Monday. Just as "Jane does 
not go to the party on Monday" might be true and not about Monday 
simply because Monday does not exist, "Jane goes to the party on 
Monday" might be false and not about Monday for the same reason. 
But, true or false, if "Jane goes to the party on Monday" is about 
Monday, then so is its negation, and if it isn't, then neither is its nega-
tion. 
The Contradiction Problem 
Unfortunately, all these closure principles (equivalence, negation 
and pure conjunction), which seem so obvious, cannot all be true. To 
see this, begin by supposing that P is a member of the set of proposi-
tions strictly about t, i.e. of the set 
I've been calling At, and that Q is 
a member of the set of proposi-
tions not strictly about t, i.e. of 
the set I've been calling Bt. This 
supposition is safe because At 0~------' 
and Bt are non-empty. By the 
negation principle, -,P is also in 
At and -,Q is in Bt . By the pure 
conjunction principle, P J\-,P is 
also in At and QJ\-,Q is in Bt . 
Because P J\-,P and QJ\-,Q, like all 
contradictions, are equivalent, 
both must be in At and both in Bt . The Contradiction Problem 
But At and Bt are, by their 
descriptions, disjoint (i.e. their 
intersection is empty), neither contradiction can be in both. So the 
negation, the pure conjunction and the equivalence principles cannot 
all be true. So Plantinga's minimalist approach to Ockhamism 
appears to be in deep trouble. 
There is a fairly obvious remedy to this problem. That is to somehow 
adjust the key principles to respect the distinction between contingent 
and non-contingent propositions. This suggests a division of logical 
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I The "Partition of Logical Space I 
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space into four subsets rather than 
two. These four subsets are the set 
of the logical truths, which we may 
call T, the set of logical falsehoods, 
which we may call F, the set of 
contingencies strictly about t, 
which we may call At*, and the set 
of contingencies not strictly about 
t, which we may call B(. By their 
descriptions, no pair of these sets 
has any common member, but 
every proposition is a member of 
one of them (i.e. the four are pair-
wise disjoint and jointly exhaus-
tive). T and F obviously have members, and, if t is neither empty nor the 
set of all moments, At * and Bt * also have members. 
Now the various closure principles require some adjustment. 
Closure under equivalence is about as you'd expect. All four of the 
sets are closed under equivalence. For T and F, this principle is obvious: 
if a proposition is equivalent to a logical truth, it is a logical truth itself, 
and if a proposition is equivalent to a logical falsehood, it is a logical 
falsehood itself. And I take it that it was really At* and Bt* that 
Plantinga took to be closed under equivalence. That is, if two contingent 
propositions are equivalent, then if one of them is strictly about a time 
period, then so is the other, and if one of them is not strictly about a time 
period, then neither is the other. So: 
The New Equivalence Principle 
If a proposition is equivalent to 
a logical truth, a logical false-
hood, a contingency strictly 
about a given time period or a 
contingency not strictly about a 
given time period, then that 
proposition is, respectively, 
also a logical truth, a logical 
falsehood, a contingency strict-
ly about the given time period 
or a contingency not s trictly 
about the given time period. r------::-_N:..:,:ew"':-_----===----=--__ ,-------, 
The "Equivalence Principle 
The appropriate moves on the 
other closure principles also sug-
gest themselves: 
The propositions P and-,P are both contingent if one of them is, and 
either both P and -,P are contingencies strictly about t, or neither P nor 
-,P are contingencies strictly about t. My ruminations about Jane and 
Mary's party-going habits above still apply perfectly here, since "Jane 
goes to the party on Monday" and the rest are all contingent. That is to 
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sa y that At * and Bt * are closed 
under negation. But the negation 
of a logical truth is a logical false-
hood, and vice versa. So: 
The New Negation Principle , 
The negation of a contingency N 
strictly about a given time peri- I 
od is also a contingency strictly 
about that time period; the 
negation of a contingency not 
strictly about a given time peri-
od is also a contingency not 
strictly about that time period, 
and the negation of a non-con-
tingency is also a non-contin-
gency with the opposite truth value. 
Faith and Philosophy 
New 
The "Negation Principle 
The pure conjunction principle can also be reworked to fit our new par-
tition of logical space, again with some obvious exceptions. For the most 
part, the conjunction of two contingencies strictly about t should still be 
strictly about t itself. Again, see my dissertation on Jane, Mary and the 
party. But a given pair of contingencies strictly about t might not be com-
patible. If so, then even if both are in A(, their conjunction belongs in F. 
Similar reasoning will yield a similar exception to the closure of Bt * under 
conjunction. However, the conjunction of two logical truths is a logical 
truth, and the conjunction of two logical falsehoods is a logical falsehood. 
So T and F are closed without 
exception under conjunction. Thus: 
The New Pure Conjunction Principle 
Either the conjunction of two 
contingencies strictly about a 
given time period is also a con-
tingency strictly about that 
time period or it is a logical 
falsehood; either the conjunc-
tion of two contingencies not 
strictly about a given time peri-
od is also a contingency not 
strictly about that time period, 
or it is a logical falsehood, and 
the conjunction of two non-
contingencies with the same 
truth-value is also a non-con-
tingency with that truth-value. 
New 
I The "Pure Conjunction Principle I 
For good measure, note that a re-done mixed conjunction principle is also 
possible: 
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The New Mixed Conjunction Principle 
Either the conjunction of two contingencies, one strictly about a 
given time period and the other not strictly about that time peri-
od, is also a contingency not strictly about that time period, or it 
is a logical falsehood. The conjunction of any given proposition 
and a logical falsehood is a logical falsehood. The conjunction of 
any given proposition and a logical truth is of the same kind as 
the given proposition. 
With this new mixed conjunction principle, "God exists during t and X 
will do A during t'" still turns out not to be strictly about t, since the sec-
ond conjunct, "X will do A during t'" is not strictly about t (whether 
"God exists during t" is a contingency strictly about t or a logical truth). 
As such, the new equivalence principle tells us that "God believed during 
t that X would do A during t'" is also not strictly about t. So even though 
t is in the past relative to t', the principle of the fixity of the past does not 
support the first premise in the theological incompatibilist's argument. 
That is, it does not show that God believed during t that X would do A 
during t' and that X cannot do anything during t' to render false the 
proposition that God believed during t that X would do A during e. 
The Biconditional Problem 
Unfortunately, these maneuvers do not solve the incompatibility 
problem. One way of proving this would be to show that the new nega-
tion, new pure conjunction and new equivalence principles are inconsis-
tent. I will take a different approach which is a bit shorter. 
Let's turn for a moment to this rather ugly equivalence regarding the 
relation between conjunction, negation and biconditionality: 
"P=Q" is equivalent to "-,( -,(P /\Q)/\-,( -,P /\-,Q»" 
The reason this equivalence is so important is that, together with the 
new equivalence principle, the new negation principle and the new pure 
conjunction principle it implies a closure principle for biconditionality. 
By successive applications of the new negation and new pure conjunc-
tion principles, it would be possible to show that if P and Q are both of 
the same kind, e.g. both strictly about the time period t, then (barring 
one or more of the exceptions to those principles) -,(-,(1' /\Q)/\-,( -,1' /\-,Q» 
is also of that kind. Since that proposition is equivalent to P=Q, if P and 
Q are of the same kind, then by the equivalence principle P=Q must be 
of the same kind as P and Q. It goes without saying that, given the 
exceptions there were for the new negation principle and the new pure 
conjunction principles, there are a lot of exceptions to the airtight closure 
of T, F, At* and Bt under biconditionality. Indeed, it will turn out to be 
simpler to think of the new 'closure' principle as simply saying that 
biconditionals from At are excluded only from Bt* and vice versa. In 
any event, here is the New Pure Biconditional Principle:12 
346 
The New Pure Biconditional Principle 
No biconditional of two contin-
gencies strictly about a given 
time period is a contingency 
not strictly about that time peri-
od; no biconditional of two con-
tingencies not strictly about a 
given time period is a contin-
gency strictly about that time 
period, and the biconditional of 
two non-contingencies with the 
same truth-value is a logical 
truth. 
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New One can see that there is a logi-
cal difficulty by supposing that P is I The "Pure Biconditional Principle I 
in the set of contingencies strictly 
about t, i.e. the set I've been calling 
At*, and that Q is in the set of con-
tingencies not strictly about t, i.e. the 
set I've been calling Bt *. Since 
these two sets are non-empty 
(given that the time period, t, is, 
like the past, neither all nor none of 
time), this assumption is safe. By 
the new negation principle, -,P is in 
At* and -,Q is in Bt*. Now one 
asks the question: Where does P=Q 
belong? The answer must be T, F, 
At * or Bt *, since these four sets 
together are exhaustive. 
If P=Q is in T, then P and Q are 
equivalent. So since P is in At *, Q 
is in At* by the new equivalence 
Where Does P=Q Belong? 
principle. Since Q is in Bt*, Q is not in At*, because the two sets are dis-
joint. So if P=Q is in T, Q is and is not in At*. 
If P=Q is in F, then P and -,Q are equivalent. So since P is in At *, -,Q 
is in At by the new equivalence principle. Since -,Q is in Bt, -,Q is not 
in At *, because the two sets are disjoint. So if P=Q is in F, -,Q is and is 
not in At. 
If P=Q is in At*, then, since P is also in At, (P=Q)=P is not in Bt* by 
the new pure biconditional principle. But (P=Q)=P is equivalent to Q, 
and Q is in Bt *, so (P=Q)=P is in Bt * by the new equivalence principle. 
So if P=Q is in At *, (P=Q)=P is and is not in Bt *. 
If P=Q is in Bt, then, since Q is also in Bt*, (P=Q)=Q is not in At* by 
the new pure biconditional principle. But (P=Q)=Q is equivalent to P, 
and P is in At, so (P=Q)=Q is in At by the new equivalence principle. 
So if P=Q is in Bt, (P=Q)=Q is and is not in At. 
SO P=Q doesn't belong anywhere if the new equivalence, the new 
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negation and the new pure conjunction (and, by these three, the new 
pure biconditional) principles are all true. But this is impossible, so 
those three principles can't all be true. Since these principles were at the 
patched up core of Plantinga's Ockhamism, his Ockhamism still appears 
to have some troubles. 
An Ockhamist Line of Defense 
A possible response from Plantinga would be to reject even the new 
negation and new pure conjunction principles. He might argue that 
there was a confusion very early on in my discussion of the contradic-
tion problem regarding what time period a contradiction is (or is not) 
strictly about. The old negation and pure conjunction principles indicate 
that P !\-.P is strictly about a given time period just in case P is strictly 
about that time period. The new negation and pure conjunction princi-
ples avoid this of course, by only making a commitment on contingent 
compounds. Contradictions are identified as logically false without any 
commitment on the time periods they are about. Similarly, tautologies 
are identified as logically true without any commitment on the time 
periods they are about. 
Plantinga might continue as follows. The problem that the new nega-
tion and new pure conjunction principles solve is that tautologies and 
contradictions are not about any time period, strictly or otherwise (I 
frankly don't know how well this coheres with other views he may 
have, so take the Plantinga I have in mind as an entirely hypothetical 
Plantinga if need be). But these new closure principles only get at the 
symptom without curing the real disease. The problem, in the case of 
(P=Q)==Q for example, is that part of this proposition is in some way not 
relevant to its truth or sense overall. There is really a contingent part of 
(P=Q)=Q (i.e. P) and a non-contingent part, (maybe Q=Q?). This propo-
sition is not about a time period in virtue of its non-contingent compo-
nent. Thus a crucial step in the biconditional problem is avoided. To 
wit, even though (P=Q) is not strictly about t, and Q is not strictly about t, 
(P=Q)=Q is strictly about t (because P is strictly about t). To say other-
wise would be to say that (P=Q)=Q is about moments other than those in 
t only because of its non-contingent component (Q=Q?). But that com-
ponent shouldn't be relevant to the time that the proposition is about. 
The considerations of the previous paragraph could lead to an even 
newer set of closure principles. Instead of these, however, I present the 
following general principle that my hypothetical Plantinga would be 
presupposing about what time periods compound propositions can be 
about: 
The Idle Complexity Principle 
A proposition which is equivalent to a truth-functionally simpler 
proposition cannot be about any moment in virtue of its additional 
complexity. 
I have two more things to say before concluding. 
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More Problems 
First, I don't find the rationale for modifying the old negation and 
pure conjunction principles very appealing. My reasons for thinking so 
have some bearing on the idle complexity principle. It seems to me that 
tautologies have perfectly good truthmaking events or states-of-affairs 
which exist at certain times. It further seems that tautologies (or any 
truths for that matter) are strictly about various time periods in virtue of 
the time periods at which their truthmakers exist. The proposition that 
either Hannibal defeated Varro at Cannae in the August of 216 BC or 
Hannibal did not defeat Varro at Cannae in the August of 216 BC has a 
truthmaker, namely Hannibal's famous victory at Cannae in the August 
of 216 Be. This truthmaker existed during the August of 216 BC, not 
during any completely separate time period. This tautology about 
Hannibal has a different truthmaker than, say, the proposition that 
Millard Fillmore assumed the Presidency in the July of AD 1850 if and 
only if Millard Fillmore assumed the Presidency in the July of AD 1850. 
r presume that this second tautology'S truthmaker was Fillmore's taking 
of the oath of office after the death of Zachary Taylor. Surely, the first 
tautology is strictly about 216 BC and the second tautology is strictly 
about AD 1850. Similar comments go for contradictions, their falsity-
makers and the times they are about. 
I believe that the concerns raised in the previous paragraph serve to 
refute the idle complexity principle as well. More complex truths have, 
it seems to me, more complex truthmakers which might exist during 
time periods during which the truthmakers of equivalent simpler truths 
might not exist. Thus more complex truths are, in general, about more 
complex time periods. Similar remarks go for more complex falsehoods. 
But for good measure, I also observe that, even if we grant the move 
to the idle complexity principle, I'm not sure that my hypothetical 
Plantinga hasn't been hoist on his own petard. After all, "God believed 
during t that X would do A during tIt' is equivalent to "God existed dur-
ing t and X will do A during t'." So by the idle complexity principle, 
since the second of these two propositions is equivalent to a truth-func-
tionally simpler proposition (the first of them) the second cannot be 
about any moment in virtue of its additional complexity. Given the idle 
complexity principle, why should one not say that God's belief existed 
at t, and not at t' so that, if anything, both propositions are strictly about 
t, not t and t'? 
In brief, my hypothetical Plantinga's problem is that with the idle 
complexity principle he's given us a reason to think that a proposition 
might be about a shorter and less complex time period than its seems to be 
about, but he's given us no reason to think that it might be about a longer 
and more complex time period. But to make Ockhamism fly as a solution 
to the foreknowledge problem, he must claim that the proposition that 
God believed during t that X would do A during t' is about a longer and 
more complex time period than it seems to be about (one including not 
only t, but also t'). 
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Conclusion 
If Plantinga wants to get Ockhamism out of trouble, I think he is 
going to have to replace the equivalence principle with a more restric-
tive closure principle. To clarify this claim, I shall say that one two-place 
relation, R, implies another, S, just in case for any pair of relata, X and Y, 
"X stands in R to Y" implies "X stands in S to Y." When I say that 
Plantinga is going to have to replace the equivalence principle with a 
more restrictive closure principle, I mean that the new principle is going 
to have to claim that the set of propositions strictly about t is closed 
under some relation, R, and R must be a relation that implies but is not 
implied by equivalence. This new, more restrictive, principle will thus be 
implied by but not imply the equivalence principle. 
Consider the relation of being-a-roundabout way-of-asserting. If 
asserting P is a roundabout way of asserting Q, it follows that P and Q 
are equivalent, but the converse is not true. So being-a-roundabout-
way-of-asserting implies the equivalence relation, but not the converse. 
I base the following principle on this relation: 
The Reassertion Pril1ciple 
If asserting one proposition is a roundabout way of asserting 
another, then the one is strictly about a given time period just in 
case the other is also. 
Since the reassertion relation implies the equivalence relation (but not 
the converse), the reassertion principle is more restrictive than the equiv-
alence principle. The reassertion principle is implied by but does not 
imply the equivalence principle. I think that the reassertion principle is 
the best bet for replacing the equivalence principle. Because the reasser-
tion principle does not imply the equivalence principle, this replacement 
would leave Plantinga free to deny the equivalence principle, while 
affirming the reassertion principle and the old negation and pure con-
junction principles. Since contradictions are equivalent but need not be 
reassertions of one another, Plantinga can handily avoid the contradic-
tion problem (let alone the biconditional problem). 
Note that this way of proceeding still leaves a Plantinga-style 
Ockhamism available as a quite plausible answer to the logical fatalist. 
The fatalist would give an argument similar in logical structure to the 
one I gave above to express the foreknowledge problem: 
(1) "It was true during t that X would do A during tin is 
true, and X cannot do anything during t' to render it 
false. 
(2) "The world existed during t and X will do A during t''' 
implies that X will do A during t'. 
(3) "It was true during t that X would do A during t'" and 
"The world existed during t and X will do A during t'" 
are equivalent. 
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(4) lilt was true during t that X would do A during t'" 
implies that X will do A during t'. (By 2 and 3) 
(5) X will do A during t', and X cannot do anything during 
t' to render false the proposition that X will do A during 
t', i.e. X could not have done otherwise. (By 1 and 4) 
Asserting that it was true during t that X would do A during t' (where 
t is, as I've been assuming all along, earlier that t') really does seem to be 
just a roundabout way of asserting that the world existed during t (so 
that something could be true then) and that X will do A during t'. Thus, 
even though "It was true during t that X would do A during t'" implies 
that X will do A during t', there is nothing necessary about the 
antecedent of this implication (at least, nothing necessary that comes 
from the principle of the fixity of the past), since asserting it is just a 
roundabout way of asserting a proposition not strictly about the past. 
Unfortunately, I don't have a systematic way of showing that assert-
ing one proposition is just a roundabout way of asserting another. I sim-
ply can't prove that "It was true during t that X would do A during t'" 
and "The world existed during t, and X will do A during t'" really are 
reassertions of each other, but doesn't it seem that way to you too? 
What I think I can prove is that although the foreknowledge problem 
does require that "God believed that X would do A during tIff and "God 
existed at t and X will do A at t'" be equivalent, the foreknowledge prob-
lem itself does not require that they be reassertions of one another. As 
such, theological incompatibilists can still offer a challenging argument 
for their incompatibilism in a way that logical fatalists cannot. 
It seems to me that there are four types of equivalence that are rele-
vant here. The first type of equivalence is reassert ion (i.e. equivalence 
based on no more than the effective identity of two assertions). As I've 
already said, I am not sure when the reassertion relation holds, so I tend 
to rely on intuition as my guide. The second type of equivalence is tau-
tological equivalence (i.e. equivalence based on no more than proposi-
tionallogic). Tautological equivalence holds between any pair of propo-
sitions when they have exactly the same truth-table. The third type of 
equivalence is de dicta equivalence (i.e. equivalence based on no more 
than logic and the meaning of words). De dicta equivalence holds 
between any pair of propositions when they are members of exactly the 
same world-books (i.e. maximal consistent sets of propositions). The 
fourth type of equivalence is de re equivalence (i.e. equivalence based on 
no more than logic, the meaning of words and the essences of things). 
De re equivalence holds between any pair of propositions when they are 
true in exactly the same possible worlds. 
It also seems to me that reassertion implies tautological equivalence, 
which implies de dicta equivalence, which in turn implies de re equiva-
lence. None of these implications go the other way. "P is true" is a 
roundabout way of saying "it is correct to assert P," so asserting the one 
proposition is effectively the same as asserting the other, the one has 
exactly the same truth-table as the other, the one is in exactly the same 
maximal consistent sets of propositions as the other and the one is true 
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at exactly the same possible worlds as the other. "P is true" is not a 
roundabout way of saying "(P=Q)=Q is true," so asserting the one 
proposition is not effectively the same as asserting the other, but the one 
does have exactly the same truth-table as the other, the one is in exactly 
the same maximal consistent sets of propositions as the other and the 
one is true in all the same possible worlds as the other. And so on. 
Now, by the contradiction and biconditional problems given above, a 
tautological equivalence principle is incompatible with the negation and 
pure conjunction principles. A reassertion principle might not be incom-
patible with these principles. But, since a de re equivalence principle 
implies a de dicto principle, which in turn implies a tautological princi-
ple, those equivalence principles would also come into conflict with the 
negation and pure conjunction principles. The equivalence between "It 
was true during t that X would do A during t'" and "The world existed 
at t and X will do A at t'" may well be a matter of reassertion. So an 
Ockhamist on the question of logical fatalism might be able to get along 
using the reassertion principle only. But the equivalence between "God 
believed that X would do A during t'" and "God existed at t and X will 
do A at t'" is a de re equivalence based on the essence of the individual 
named God. So, it seems to me that no Ockhamist on the foreknowledge 
problem can escape the inconsistency noted above by shifting to the 
reassertion principle. 
Furthermore, saying that God believed during t that X would do A 
during t' just does not seem to be a roundabout way of saying that God 
existed during t and X would do A during t'. The former is about God's 
mental state. The latter is about God's existence and X's action-the 
fusion of those two facts, one in the past and one in the future. The 
reassertion principle does not apply. So I have no reason to say that the 
former is not strictly about t even though the latter is not strictly about t. 
So versions of Ockhamism such as the one Plantinga endorses, do not 
provide a way of reconciling foreknowledge and human freedom. This 
in spite of the fact that, in the main, that is what Ockhamists like 
Plantinga try to do. But when based on the reassertion principle instead 
of the equivalence principle, Plantinga-style Ockhamism at least gives 
one a nice way of handling logical fatalism. 
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